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BOOK REVIEW
THE PROMISE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS
IN TIMES OF TRANSITION
PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR
AND ATROCITY. New York and London: Routledge, 2001. ix + 340.
Reviewed by Mariah Jackson Christensen*
The international community currently faces the painful reality that,
despite the rallying cry "never again," profligate state-sponsored and
armed-opposition human rights violations remain widespread. Dealing
with these violations in the context of transitional governance is a prob-
lem that many emerging democracies have faced and will continue to
face in the near and distant future. The present transition underway in
Afghanistan and increasing household familiarity with grievous Taliban
offenses highlight the immediacy of the vexing question of what to do
with past atrocities when attempting to start anew. The current situation
in nations throughout the world, Afghanistan included, indicates that this
question will not go away any time soon.
Punishing human rights violators by putting them on trial rarely
plumbs beneath the surface of a regime's atrocity-laden past, instead vis-
iting consequences on only a few while leaving victims feeling
betrayed.' One alternative to traditional prosecutions is the so-called
"truth commission." Whether indeed conceived as an alternative, or
rather as a supplement to modes of retributive justice, truth commissions
have emerged as a major force on the transitional justice stage. Hayner
defines a truth commission by its primary characteristics:
(1) truth commissions focus on the past; (2) they investigate a
pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific
event; (3) a truth commission is a temporary body, typically in
operation for six months to two years, and completing its work
with the submission of a report; and (4) these commissions are
officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state (and
sometimes also by the armed opposition, as in a peace accord).'
* Mariah Christensen is a recent graduate of Northwestern University School of Law.
She is currently a Staff Attorney for the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. She would like to thank
Douglass W. Cassel, Jr. for his assistance and input.
1. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR
AND ATROCITY 88-90 (2001).
2. Id. at 14-
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Unspeakable Truths provides an excellent practical survey of truth
commissions, suitable for both fledgling democratic governments
grappling with available options for appropriately coping with past
abuses, as well as students of international human rights seeking to
understand the who, what, when, where, how, and why of truth
commissions. As Hayner notes, answers to many important questions
concerning implementation and methodology are contingent on the
particular set of circumstances within which a given truth commission is
working Hayner nonetheless admirably fulfills her avowed goal of
helping readers "better understand how states and individuals might
reckon with horrible abuses of the past, and specifically to understand
the role played by truth commissions-the name that has been given to
official bodies set up to investigate and report on a pattern of past human
rights abuses."' Hayner also competently meets her stated goals to
"bridge the gap between theory and practice; to fairly represent the
experiences of the victims, the hopes of human rights advocates, and the
dilemmas of policymakers " '5 Unspeakable Truths dissects the truth
commission phenomenon into manageable pieces, using vivid examples
and supporting details to distill important lessons from twenty-one truth
commissions from 1974 to date.
Summaries of these twenty-one commissions provide the foundation
from which Hayner approaches such fundamental questions as:
(1) what compels a country to create a truth commission,
(2) what "truth" a commission should or will uncover,
(3) the relationship between "truth" and more traditional justice,
(4) the question of whether to include names in a truth
commission report,
(5) how and whether truth is a precursor to reconciliation,
(6) what psychological concerns a commission will encounter,
and
(7) questions concerning potential reforms, reparations, general
nuts and bolts, and the role of the larger international
community.
The preliminary truth commission sketches, along with more de-
tailed examples culled from each commission's experiences, help to
secure Hayner's theoretical and practical scaffolding. The varying ex-
3. Id. at 7 passim.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 9.
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periences of each commission lend credence to the undercurrent running
throughout Unspeakable Truths that there can be no "Truth Commis-
sions for Dummies" guide providing a convenient how-to for countries
intent on airing their sordid pasts in hopes of securing more peaceful
futures. Hayner instead sets parameters by comparing and contrasting
the achievements and failings of the various commissions, providing the
reader with a set of questions to ask when implementing a commission,
as well as a roadmap covering the rocky terrain of past commissions that
should also provide some degree of assistance to those who will navigate
the uncharted territory of commissions to come.
The lack of solid conclusions is at once one of Unspeakable Truths'
greatest strengths and most disappointing weaknesses. Because Hayner
draws on a wide variety of truth commission models that have met with
varying degrees of success, there is, in the end, no ready-made truth
commission template arising from her observations and recommenda-
tions. Critics may question Hayner's tendency to avoid taking a firm
stance and her penchant for prescribing aspirational recommendations at
best. However, Hayner astutely recognizes that adaptability is essential
to a truth commission's ability to fill the interstices between traditional
modes of justice and impunity or failure to acknowledge the past. A one-
size-fits-all model would inhibit commissions' ability to engender broad
restorative justice where other, more traditional models either fail or in-
adequately address the unique problems facing nations emerging from
troubled histories.
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS BY CHAPTER
Hayner begins with the essential question, "to remember, or to for-
get?''6 Building on earlier work where she challenged the international
norm imposing a duty on countries to remember and explore past atroci-
ties,7 Hayner does not entirely sidestep the difficult issue of whether
investigating the truth should be the default starting point for a nation
recovering from an abusive regime. She devotes some time to the issue
in chapter twelve, but never fully explores it, choosing instead to proceed
on the basis that in most cases it is desirable for countries attempting to
6. Id. at 1.
7. See Priscilla B. Hayner, International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of
Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 173,
174 [hereinafter Hayner, International Guidelines] (questioning whether "intensive truth seek-
ing should be a universal norm" by reference to Mozambique and Cambodia). In Unspeakable
Truths, Hayner expands upon this discussion in chapter twelve, Leaving the Past Alone.
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surmount their abusive pasts to confront the abuses of the prior regime
and/or the armed opposition.
Hayner suggests that "[t]here are a range of emotional and psycho-
logical survival tactics for those who have experienced such brutal
atrocities."8 This range provides a mooring for Hayner's work by allow-
ing her to incorporate victims' voices while exploring the variety of
paths those creating truth commissions can take.. The victims' experi-
ences ostensibly comprise the backbone of any truth commission, but
many of the challenges and limitations commissions face in fact prevent
the individual victim or victim's family from fully benefiting from the
commission's work.
Hayner identifies three generalities emerging from victims' and
other participants' and observers' experiences with truth commissions.
First, the aspirations of truth commissions regularly exceed their actual
potential; second, similar problems confront each new commission; and
third, truth commissions and their work have potential unforeseen long-
term consequences.9 These generalities undergird Unspeakable Truths as
a whole. Hayner includes much anecdotal evidence that tethers poten-
tially unbridled aspirations of truth commission participants.
Additionally, the recurring problems commissions face provide the basis
for Hayner's recommendations. Finally, awareness of the long-term con-
sequences Hayner highlights is essential to the ability of future
commissions to take full advantage of her recommendations.
Chapters two and three furnish a foundation for subsequent issues
Hayner addresses by briefly exploring available models for confronting
past horrors and explaining the reasons a country might choose to im-
plement a truth commission in particular. A truth commission's aims can
include any of the following: "to discover, clarify, and formally ac-
knowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to
contribute to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsi-
bility and recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce
conflict over the past."'" Some advantages Hayner ascribes to truth com-
missions include their focus on victims, their ability to augment rather
than displace court systems and to pave the way for forgiveness by iden-
tifying who needs to be forgiven, and their furtherance of an increasing
number of international instruments and norms recognizing a right to the
truth."
8. HAYNER, supra note I, at 2.
9. Id. at 8-9.
10. Id. at 24.
11. See id. at 24-31, (citing Article 19, Malawi's Past: The Right to the Truth, CENSOR-
SHIP NEWS 1993, at 3, and Juan E. Mdndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HuM. RTS. Q.
255 (1997), to the effect that article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
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Chapters four and five summarize the experiences of the twenty-one
commissions Hayner believes fall within her definition of a "truth com-
mission." In chapter four, Hayner identifies truth commissions in
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, South Africa, and Guatemala as providing
the most guidance for future truth commissions. In chapter five Hayner
describes the experiences of Uganda (1974), Bolivia, Uruguay,
Zimbabwe, Uganda (1986-1995), Nepal, Chad, South Africa (1992),
Germany, South Africa (1995-2000), Sri Lanka, Haiti, Burundi,
Ecuador, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The conclusions Hayner draws from
these perhaps less notable truth commissions are largely less auspicious
than their counterparts described in chapter four. However, their inclu-
sion is imperative because they illuminate many potential pitfalls, which
future truth commissions may be able to avoid. The particular truth
commission descriptions in the two chapters together provide a common
thread that Hayner then weaves through the remainder of the book via
individual and institutional experiences.
Chapter six explicates the relationship between the "truth" that a
truth commission discovers and the commission's mandate, its method-
ology, and the type of information it collects. Hayner focuses on the
need for an adaptable mandate that will allow the commission to gather
information unconstrained by predetermined requirements. The mandate
should also require the commission to gather information about "all pat-
terns of abuse." 2 Through several social scientists' experiences, Hayner
emphasizes the importance of methodology. She notes alternatives to
myopic analyses of names and numbers-including questioning focused
on the broader picture, with attention to both who came to the truth
commission and why, and the effect of witnesses' experiences on the
community at large.'3 The ability of a truth commission to move beyond
the mere taking of testimony to find broader social and psychological
implications may allow it to transcend its situational importance by
combating the causes of abuse directly.
Chapter seven addresses truth commissions' compatibility with
traditional court justice and chapter eight explores the question of
whether a truth commission should name names, building on the
previous chapter's focus by concentrating on due process. Despite
international obligations to prosecute crimes against humanity, logistical,
African Charter on Human and People's Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights' ruling in the Veldsquez-Rodriguez case suggest a right to truth).
12. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 77. Hayner builds on her thesis in International Guidelines
that minimal standards for truth commissions should require that official truth seeking "is
done in good faith, [resulting] in an honest and unrestricted investigation." Hayner, Interna-
tional Guidelines, supra note 7, at 180.
13. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 80-85.
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political, and practical considerations in most cases prevent prosecution
of all but a very few individuals. Hayner convincingly challenges the
notions that truth commissions and traditional prosecutions are simply
substitutes for one another, and that gaining the benefits of one requires
losing the benefits of the other.'4 For example, it is estimated that the trial
of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic will take several
years.'" Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic-general in command of
the Bosnian Serb army and first president of the Bosnian Serb
administration, respectively-have yet to be brought before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on their July
and November 1995 indictments for, among other things, genocide and
crimes against humanity.'6 Although international treaties and customary
international law require prosecution of such crimes, these outstanding
warrants illustrate the difficulties surrounding international prosecution
of even the most senior officials and egregious rights-violators. These
cases are but one example of the time and support (in this case
international) needed for prosecutions to succeed. Often these crucial
ingredients are notably absent, both nationally and internationally, in
transitional regimes. Yet the ingredients for a successful truth
commission might be in place in such cases.
Even when trials are feasible, truth commissions can provide impor-
tant information and may enhance and advance justice in the courts."
The record of such endeavors is far from clear, however, as illustrated by
the six countries where Hayner examines the interplay between a truth
commission and trials or prosecutions.'8 Whereas the files from Argen-
tina's truth commissions were crucial to subsequent prosecutions,' 9 the
release of El Salvador's truth commission report led to the sweeping am-
nesty passed less than one week thereafter.0 The trials that did result in
Argentina fell short of exacting full accountability from perpetrators, and
have been characterized by some as essentially a failure.2' Hayner neither
14. Id. at 86-87.
15. See, e.g., John Laughland, Victors' Justice, SPECTATOR, Feb. 9, 2002, at 2002 WL
14837774.
16. See, e.g., Charles M. Madigan, Crimes Against Humanity: A UN Tribunal Prosecu-
tor's Quest to Bring Two of the World's Worst Criminals to Justice, CHI. ThIB., Jan. 4, 2002,
§ 5, at 1. Mladic and Karadzic's indictments are available at http://www.un.org/icty/
indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm.
17. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 90.
18. Id. at 90-100 (examining Argentina, Uganda, Haiti, Chile, and South Africa).
19. Id. at 93-94.
20. Id. at 91.
21. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Nothing But the Truth? Transitional Regimes Confront the
Past, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 713, 722 (1995) (book review) (citing Jaime Malamud-Goti, Pun-
ishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledgling Democracies: The Case of Argentina, in IMPUNITY
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skirts the perceived shortcomings of truth commissions and trials nor
wavers in her assertion that truth commissions can, and have, offered
important and utilitarian contributions to "justice." Instead of focusing
on some golden mean derived from existing international law that places
a duty on countries to investigate and prosecute all such crimes, Hayner
considers the practical realities of transitional justice, and credibly con-
cludes that truth commissions, on balance, assist rather than displace or
hinder traditional forms of justice.
Naming names in a truth commission report is clearly one method of
assisting judicial efforts. Hayner approaches the problem of whether to
name names in a truth commission report as a determination to be made
by weighing the competing principles of adequate due process and com-
mitment to memorializing the full truth." The guidelines Hayner settles
on reflect these concerns. First, individuals who will be named should be
notified of both the intention to name them and the allegations to be
made. Second, some procedure should be in place allowing the in-
dividual to defend his or her actions before the commission. Third, the
report should indicate that its conclusions are not tantamount to a finding
of criminal guilt.23
By offering these guidelines, Hayner begs the question whether a
uniform standard for naming names should develop or whether-like
most decisions by truth commissions--defining the standard should be
left to individual commissions in light of their specific needs and man-
dates. The answer depends to some degree on one's perception of a
commission's purpose and the role it plays vis-A-vis criminal proceed-
ings. Can a truth commission, by naming names, really serve as a viable
alternative form of justice where naming names requires ignoring basic
due process? It seems crucial for a commission to employ safeguards
sufficient to prevent its gains from being undermined by naming names
in revisionist fashion; yet a truth commission cannot be expected to
adopt the full protections of a criminal trial without sacrificing many of
its strengths. Hayner's suggested safeguards seem to strike a fair balance
between such competing concerns.
In chapter nine, Hayner proceeds to discuss the limitations of truth
commissions in handling the psychological effects of mass violence.
This chapter speaks most directly to what this reviewer believes consti-
tutes the most powerful element of truth commissions-the individual.
Many laud truth commissions as the answer to the problem posed by the
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 160-70 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza
ed., 1995)).
22. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 107.
23. Id. at 129-30.
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model of retributive justice that largely excludes victims. Even as trials,
both nationally 24 and internationally," have begun to incorporate more
victim awareness and involvement with the judicial process, the truth
commission remains an alternative that many believe more effectively
addresses the personal suffering of individuals, shifting-as one author
posits-from the perception that crimes are committed against "faceless
state[s]" that must mete out punishment, to one where they are viewed as
committed against living, breathing human beings. 6 Others focus on the
apparently universal need individuals have to talk about the brutality
they have experienced or witnessed, as a critical first step toward even
partial emotional recovery.27 Albie Sachs described witnesses testifying
before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as
speaking to relieve themselves from the pain of carrying the memories
associated with their experiences, compounded by the "extra pain"
caused by lack of acknowledgment. 2' There is almost universal agree-
ment that having experienced or witnessed the kinds of horror truth
commissions unearth-either as a perpetrator, victim, or witness-it is
psychologically detrimental to attempt to bury the event without ever
confronting or coping with it in some way. However, whether a truth
24. The increasing popularity of victim impact statements demonstrates this. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (expanding the permissible use of victim impact
statements to the context of capital sentencing); Niru Shanker, Getting a Grip on Payne and
Restricting the Influence of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing: The Timothy
McVeigh Case and Various State Approaches Compared, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 711, 712-
13 (1999) (describing the "overwhelming" state and federal responses to the "victims' rights
movement" and the almost universal acceptance of victim impact statements in non-capital
criminal cases).
25. See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at ch.
2, § 1(2) (Victims and Witnesses Unit), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.l (2000) (providing
for, among other things, notification of victims, assistance for victims to exercise their legal
rights, relocation for threatened witnesses, and support services for traumatized victims),
available at http://www.un.orgIlaw/icc/statute/rules/rulefra.htm; RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, at R. 34
(Victims and Witnesses Unit), R. 69 (Protection of Victims and Witnesses), R. 75 (Measures
for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses), R. 106 (Compensation to Victims), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.20 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpc/IT32_rev22con.htm.
26. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always be Prosecuted:
Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205,
214 (2000) (citing TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF S. AFR., REPORT, ch. 5, para. 82
(1998)).
27. See HAYNER, supra note 1, at 2-3 (noting that it is impossible for many of those who
have witnessed or experienced abuse to recover without remembering or telling their stories);
Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 429, 429-30 (1999) (discussing the damage that repressing trauma can cause);
Albie Sachs, Truth and Reconciliation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1563, 1567-68 (1999) (recounting
the importance to South Africans of speaking publicly about their suffering, thus having it
acknowledged).
28. Sachs, supra note 27, at 1567-69.
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commission is necessary or adequate for this task remains questionable,
as Hayner indicates .
Both the nation and the individuals emerging from a regime rife with
human rights abuse must move on. In Hayner's estimation, such moving
on inevitably involves encouraging reconciliation and promoting institu-
tional reform that will prevent past tragedy from recurring. She draws a
crucial distinction between national reconciliation and individual recon-
ciliation, crediting a truth commission with the ability to advance
"national" or "political" reconciliation, not necessarily "individual" rec-
onciliation.3° This raises the question of whether a truth commission's
primary "hope for healing"3' is similarly national as opposed to individ-
ual in scope. In chapter nine Hayner acknowledges the mixed record on
truth commissions, noting that although telling one's story may be an
essential first step toward recovery, the truth commission itself is not
"long-term therapy."32 Hayner cites several alarming cases where indi-
viduals who testified before a truth commission became markedly more
troubled than they had been before testifying.33 The dichotomy between
the macro view of a nation as a whole and the micro view of an individ-
ual victim of that nation's painful past poses a unique problem for a
commission dedicated to remembering and attempting to understand that
past. Martha Minow posits that because of the chance truth commissions
offer individuals to tell their stories, commissions have independent
value, not as an alternative to prosecutions (as is often argued34), but as a
necessary tool for "re-membering" and healing victims as "distinctive
individuals."3"
Hayner provides a powerful message for would-be truth
commissions, whether they are designed to serve the needs of individual
members of society, of the society as a whole, or-more likely--of both.
She recommends a number of measures truth commissions should
implement to ensure that victims are not further traumatized by their
experiences with the commission, and that they are able to obtain
recovery assistance beyond that provided by the commission. Perhaps
where the micro and macro views meet, then, is in the concept that each
29. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 135.
30. Id. at 155.
31. Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH
V. JUSTICE 235 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
32. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 135.
33. Id. at 141-44.
34. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights
Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at
81.
35. Minow, supra note 27, at 432.
36. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 145-48, 153.
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individual case of suffering, taken as a composite, comprises the
suffering nation in dire need of healing. The difficulty remaining, of
course, is that despite the promise a truth commission holds to help heal
a nation, victims (as Hayner and others note) must often relive the agony
of their experiences, receiving only heightened trauma and anxiety in
return.37
There is a great deal of promise in the idea of giving individuals a
voice and offering some official acknowledgment of their suffering.
However, when the commission completes its work, it may seem that the
individual has been lost in the course of its focus on the nation,38 and it
may simply be false to pretend the individual victim is better served by a
truth commission in the end. Yet where trials offer "justice" to those
prosecuted, truth commissions document, however briefly, the plights of
individuals, and may therefore be indispensable to maintaining the indi-
vidual human rights international law ultimately seeks to protect. In the
shuffle of a nation's transition from the horrors of mass atrocity, room
must be left to acknowledge the experience of each individual that, to-
gether with hundreds or thousands of others, provides the basis for the
label "mass atrocity" in the first place. Obviously a truth commission
cannot realistically do this with respect to every person, but commissions
realize this goal more than most other options, and are desirable for this
reason. Hayner's attention to this issue forces the reader to confront
these individuals and grapple with the profound implications for good or
ill that a truth commission may have on them.
Chapters ten and eleven deal with truth commissions' ramifications
for future action, including reconciliation, institutional reform, and repa-
ration efforts. In the reconciliation arena, Hayner depicts truth
commissions as having the potential to promote national as opposed to
individual reconciliation. Since an entire society is typically in transi-
tion, it is the entire society that must reconcile itself to its past in order to
move forward. There is thus an apparent conflict between the national
focus for reconciliation purposes and the potential for a more individual-
ized focus in the context of the day-to-day operation of the commission
itself. However, it is a truth commission's potential to promote future
institutional reform that will hopefully yield some national reconcilia-
tion. South Africa has perhaps seen the best "fit" between national
reconciliation and individual attention-not only because of its commis-
37. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 152-53; Angelika Schlunck, Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 421 (1998) (citing Suzanne Daley, In Apart-
heid Inquiry, Agony Is Relived but Not Put to Rest, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997, at Al).
38. Minow notes that even the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission re-
port, supra note 26, one of the most comprehensive to-date, could not accommodate even a
sentence from any of the over 20,000 testifying survivors. Minow, supra note 27, at 433.
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sion's name, but because the entire process there was meant to trigger
structural and systemic reformation. Reparations generally focus on in-
dividuals, but the fact that a government sponsors a reparations program
may sow seeds of national reconciliation.
Chapter twelve deals with circumstances where a country may "le-
gitimately choose to forgo official truth-seeking at the time of
transition."39 While thoroughly explaining the circumstances of Mozam-
bique and Cambodia, Hayner does little to develop any clear standard by
which to measure the "legitimacy" of a country's ultimate choice to es-
chew any official process for uncovering past abuses. Given the
international norm Hayner herself identifies as suggesting a "right to
truth,"4 perhaps there should be some agreed-upon standard for deter-
mining those occasions when the norm need not be followed. Hayner
emphasizes in her introduction the importance of leaving the final deci-
sion on this count to the "country and its people."4 Yet this stance
detracts from the normative view based on the concept that human rights
violations so egregious as to be appropriately dubbed "crimes against
humanity" demand the attention of humanity as a whole and cannot be
forgotten at a country's own behest.
42
Chapter thirteen explores the relationship between the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and truth commissions, including the possibility of
a truth commission equivalent as a part of the Court, which Hayner
warns against. Because of the fundamentally different nature of prosecu-
tions and truth commissions, and the potential that assuming the latter
role would detrimentally splay the Court's focus, Hayner instead sug-
gests that in certain cases the ICC could release a summary of
information used for each prosecution upon completion. Such informa-
tion specific to a certain region or situation may fulfill some of the same
functions as a truth commission report.
Chapter fourteen is the closest Hayner comes to providing a user's
guide to truth commissions. She covers a great deal of ground,
discussing who should implement a commission and give it power, who
should serve on the truth commission, the important question of timing
for the truth commission, financing and methodological issues, whether
public or private hearings are more appropriate, the decision about what
to record and how to record it, and the level of proof needed to justify a
commission's conclusions. The wealth of practical information and
firsthand experience in this chapter alone ensures that Hayner's
39. Id. at 186.
40. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
41. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 9.
42. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commis-
sions and International Criminal Tribunals, 28 NY.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485, 496 (1996).
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contribution to understanding the role and utility of truth commissions
will remain a seminal source for years to come. Hayner's suggestions
draw from a range of possibilities to provide helpful guidelines without
appearing tendentious or overstepping Richard J. Goldstone's charge to
"eschew generalizations" when approaching the issue of justice for a
"society in transition.""
Chapter fifteen covers the relationship of outside parties to the truth
commission, such as NGOs and various other international actors. Using
examples of outside cooperation, or non-cooperation as the case may be,
Hayner conveys the important role such outside organizations can play,
both with regard to a truth commission's ability to garner information
and to its overall success. This chapter also looks at the varying degrees
of success truth commissions have had with accessing official informa-
tion, as well as with countering outside forces threatening the stability
and integrity of both the commission as a whole and the witnesses and
staff members associated with it.
Lastly, Hayner's epilogue is a powerful reminder that truth commis-
sions cannot be ignored. Fortunately, future undertakings of this nature
will have Unspeakable Truths as an important tool to contribute to their
success. Hayner's appendices assist this contribution with detailed charts
of each commission she discusses and a chronicle of her interviews.
CONCLUSION
Hayner has provided a volume that will be of critical importance to
anyone interested in the human rights arena generally, or the utility and
operation of truth commissions more specifically. While some may wish
that she were more unequivocal on some points, this is a minor quibble.
Though lacking in the wide-ranging theoretical perspectives and conclu-
sions of volumes like Truth v. Justice," Transitional Justice,4' and
Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice,46 the
practical value and significance of Unspeakable Truths is unsurpassed.
Additionally, Hayner's artful use of personal stories and experiences
provide richness and accessibility that many of the contributions to this
burgeoning field lack. Overall Hayner has produced a much-needed
practical chronicle, overview, and explication of truth commissions-one
that is a must for the library of any student or practitioner of human
43. Id. at 486.
44. See supra note 3 I.
45. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER RE-
GIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
46. See supra note 21.
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rights, and one that will long be the standard against which subsequent
studies of truth commissions will be evaluated.
